

THE STATE, GOV'T OF N.Y.  
COUNTY OF N.Y.

IN SENATE

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## 1. The Nordic Countries

The Nordic quest for centuries, perhaps for millennia, have looked to others somewhat like Spitzbergen today, or Greenland: an ultima Thule, much beyond the last outpost. And yet we were there, and still are. More precisely, I shall count nine Nordic nations, eight of which are members of the Nordic Council, the ninth - to give it a name - is the Faroe Islands. They come in four layers or circles:

- there is a core pair of two countries, Denmark and Sweden, never dominating any other Nordic country; after centuries of warfare finally settling in the present borders with Germany as the dividing line. Then,
- there are the six dominated parts, and they can be conveniently divided into two groups:
  - three countries, Norway, Finland and Iceland, regaining autonomy only in this century from Danish, then Swedish; Swedish, then Russian and Danish control respectively
  - three island countries, Faroe, Norway and Greenland, under Finnish, Danish and Danish control respectively. And then,
- there is a nation, the Sami nation, consisting of the Lapp and Sami (Lapins) natives in Greenland, Norway, Sweden and Finland, the North or Arctic part of the Nordic countries.

Thus, the composition of the Nordic group is complicated, but not very complicated. Obviously, today there is no or very little distinction between the first and second circle; that all (or mostly) belongs to history. Not being autonomous to the point of being a possible UN member is important, however. And not having almost any of the instruments of statehood, as is the case for the Arctic peoples is very important. There is conflict material, there are struggles to be fought - hopefully with no violence from either side, controllers or controlled.

But by and large the shape of the Nordic system is clear. For the foreseeable future it is very hard to imagine any part of the system trying to control any other part or parts. Dominance is on the way out in the Nordic world. What is possible is some form of fusion with all or some of them coming more closely together, or some kind of fission in the sense of more decentraliza-

tion inside countries, with some parts as all less dependent on the capitals in these relatively solidly built nation-states. Preserving a basic pattern of equality there would still be room for some fusion and fission processes after all nine have attained membership in the Nordic Council and the Sagitt nation has acquired more of those instruments (a flag, a center, a university, internal autonomy with legislative, executive and judicial powers of their own less ruled by a national parliament where they are left unrepresented leaving that aside, our focus in this little study is on the possible fusion and fission processes, in the light of the historical and global contexts.

Let first some more words about the intra-Nordic history. There is the Golden Age, in a certain sense - the Viking Era, with the West Vikings expanding westwards, towards the British Isles, of course Iceland and Greenland, into Vinland, presumably into America of today, and the East Vikings expanding eastwards, into Russia, Novgorod and onwards. Then they went further south both of them and met at Constantinople<sup>(17)</sup>. Traders and pirates mainly, with the exception of exploration of the North, Iceland with not only intellectual/unitive/library traditions but also democracy: still very much in evidence in that remarkable, ongoing generalization of the truth in the Grail is Beautiful thesis.

Norway was not able to keep up with this expansionist tradition, possibly because of the weakness of the country's nobility, fighting each other, being cut down by kings jealous of their potential power, heavily hit by the Black Death<sup>(18)</sup>. Denmark and Sweden continued the tradition, expanding northwards, westwards southwards and eastwards, all over , including the Nordic system itself which they divided between them. The other two, Finland and Estonia, were not so lucky. The others did not engage in such ventures. And, except for the period 1939-45, the Nordic region covered a region of domination. And that was for some expansionist!

2. The content: the world as three circles

Let us now place the Nordic countries in the center of our attention, and look at them - in a very Nordic-centric manner - as surrounded by three circles: the world as seen from the North.

The first circle - surrounding the Nordic countries - comprises Northwestern Europe and North America. These are the "first countries" with which it is natural to anyone ourselves; the reference group, so to speak. In Swedish, first, Germany; then France, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland, etc.

The second circle would take in Eastern and Southern Europe. And, for historical reasons and - probably - also for "biological" reasons, it makes sense to include the North African and West Asian countries as well as the Mediterranean. After all, they have had little in common with the countries south of the Sahara and the countries east of Mesopotamia, respectively. Historically it was the deserts and the mountain ranges that were dividing, not the Mediterranean. Catholic and Orthodox, Islamic and Jewish; northern rich and northern poor - but visible, accessible.

The third circle would take in the rest of the world: South America, the Caribbean, Africa south of the Sahara, Asia east of Mesopotamia, Oceania. All these parts are remote. It is not that many people in the Nordic countries feel themselves influenced, even scared by the third circle. And they would feel threatened if they did, as during the old circle in 1917/18. They may feel themselves as ruled by second circle history, as part of first circle history, but as neither parts of, nor as ruled by the third circle (also, the periphery of the second circle is remote, such as North Africa, West Asia and the Soviet Union that is non-European and/or east of the Urals). This is all what will reflect in textbooks in history and geography which would also have a "rest of the world" category. Nordic expansionism, even colonialism, would tend to be self-justified, however - and so would the position of the Vikings. Only Latin America and Christian, the third circle was pagan, poor, inferior.

### 3. A macro-historical overview.

To explore this more in detail a very brief glimpse of history might be useful. For this purpose one might divide the second circle of the map, roughly speaking Europe and the coastal states of the Mediterranean, into four parts, by drawing two lines. One of the lines coincides with the Alps and their continuation in the Carpathians; it might also be continued towards the West, cutting through France, perhaps ending with the Pyrenees. But it may also be argued that Occitanie is to the south of the line. The other line runs from north to south, following the linguistic border between the Slavonic and Germanic speaking people, from the Adriatic, past the Balkans, to the Caucasus, at the Hungarians and the Rumanians, the Albanians and the Greeks, and the Turks. The latter East would be orthodox, and even use Cyrillic letters. It is not, however, so important to define the lines in very precise terms since the conceptual tools to be used are only rough ideas about a distinction between northern and southern Europe on the one hand, corresponding to the old distinction between cis-alpina and trans-alpina, and anybody's intuitive notion of distinctions between western and eastern Europe. What is important, however, is that this conception of southern Europe, together with the North African coastal states, serves to define the Mediterranean region when we include the Arab states bordering on the Mediterranean and Palestine/Israel. Maybe this leads to something like 25 countries, it is not so important to know. In extension it is not too different from the Roman empire at its heyday except for its northern outposts; enclosing the mare nostrum the Mediterranean sea itself. Obviously, the NW, SE and SW part of this map form the second circle seen from the North, whereas the NE part is the first circle, with the Nordic countries - perhaps with Finland both in NW and SE, as Swedish province and Russian grand duchy. The problem to be discussed can now be phrased using the concept of power-gradient: given the two axes, where are the highs and lows of power in various phases of history? We shall then distinguish between three types of power: political/military power ultimately defined as "who <sup>controls</sup> invades whom"; economic power ultimately defined as "who exploits whom" (whether it is through simple robbery or the more intricate practices of investment in capital goods and transfer of surplus characterizing industrial capitalism, or corresponding practices in mercantile capitalism); and cultural power roughly defined as "who forms (shapes) whom". Needless to say, these forms of power are related and have all kinds of spill-over effects from one into the other. They are, in fact, the three classical types of power: the stick, the carrot and the idea; coercive, remunerative and normative power.

There is no doubt that the Roman empire put the center of power in the south. They invaded the north, they exploited the north and they shaped the north - the latter so much so that even in this century the concept of being a person with culture, with Bildung, is related to internalization of southern culture, for instance knowledge of Latin and Greek, in other words southern languages; today not even spoken in the region. <sup>derived cultural prestige from speaking Norwegian</sup> However, the center was in the west rather than in the east by the mere fact that Rome was located in that part. But that part collapsed in the fifth century.

The Middle Ages can perhaps be seen as a period in which the power distribution between the four parts of the region we are discussing became more symmetric, with the exception of the clear cultural power emanating from Rome, now in the form of the Catholic Church. It was only with the advent of Protestantism that a certain symmetry in cultural power was obtained, with strong islands of Protentantism established in the Catholic sea, with almost unchanging lords for the last three hundred years or so. The economic counter-part included the Hanseatic League that - of course - started much earlier (13th century).

It may perhaps be said that Protestantism gave a more clear expression to some basic items of western social cosmology inherited from Greek antiquity: a strong accent on individualism and competition, expansion in space and a highly dramatic conception of time. Life was <sup>perhaps</sup> safer, more protected, more collective under Catholicism than it became under Protestantism, although the difference should not be exaggerated. At the same time mercantile capitalism was so successful in the North that large-scale capital accumulation started taking place. Ultimately <sup>perhaps</sup> to the industrial revolution in the north-western corner of the region, probably based on a combination of capital accumulation (that <sup>actually derived from Spanish conquests - capital used to buy goods</sup>) used for investment in capital goods, not only for buying merchandise, and the clear expression of western cosmology found in various types of Protestant thinking. Alone neither of these factors would have made it, together they probably account to a large extent for the rise of modern capitalism in that corner.

In short: the power-center shifted towards the North and it shifted towards the West - later on to proceed to the Far West, the United States. And thus it became a highly lopsided region with political/military, economic and cultural gradients running from west to east and from north to south. It was the Swedes, the French and the Germans that invaded the Slavs, not the other way round. It was they who had command over the trade between west and east, not the other way round. And it was they who, particularly since the times of Peter the Great, started shaping the east, not the other way round. And similarly for the north/south gradient: the trade pattern quickly became industrial goods from the north against food-stuffs etc. from the south, after the Hanseatic League had created a balance relative to southern traditional trading superiority that corresponded to the Protestant religious counterbalance to Catholicism, responsible for much of the capital accumulation. Of course, the north also invaded the south, an early example being northern France relative to southern France, later the establishment of the colonies, mainly by the French and the British, on the southern (and eastern) Mediterranean seaboard. The Ottoman empire played the picture as a bulwark and a negotiating point, lasted five hundred years; it was restricted to the south-eastern corner. But after its breakdown its function became more clear: as a bulwark against north-western penetration which immediately took place, politically/militarily, economically, culturally when the Ottoman empire collapsed. This also concerned the Soviet Union and its hegemonial position relative to most of eastern Europe: north-western economic and cultural penetration would probably have been even more pronounced if it had not been for the political/military balance created after the Second World War. In fact, the Soviet Union was the axis of the Cold War revolutionary socialism between the wars, from Lenin/Malin to the East European dictators and Khrushchev to Kádár, Brezhnev and Polanski as the second circle trying to rise against the USSR. In this paper we are, however, notably concerned with the east-west axis but also the north-south axis. The latter is important along the east-west axis, but the east-west axis is particularly important along the north-south axis, the South axis. It is important to start thinking not only in terms of contradictions and conflicts along the west-east gradient, but also along the north-south gradient, pitting northern Europe not only against southern Europe, but against more of the south, the Mediterranean region as such. Thinking should not lag too much behind reality. And reality today is that the north-south axis is becoming more and more important, particularly in the Mediterranean region.

Concretely the power-gradient has forms that are well known to any observer of current world affairs. Thus the military political headquarters of the world are in the north: Washington and Moscow to mention the superpowers, NATO (in Brussels) and the Warsaw Treaty Organizstion (WTO) to mention the alliances. It is they who use the Mediterranean for the deployment of their ships, not the south that uses the northern waters for the deployment of theirs. The block system meets at time in a network of conferences in the north with the superpowers and alliances meeting each other; there is very little contact of politically/militarily meaningful kind between their more peripheral members in the south. Economically the headquarters are all in the north: New York for the American Economy, Brussels for the European Community, Moscow for the CMEA system. This is where decisions are taken regarding the south, not vice versa. The economies of the south are shaped by the demands from the north, not vice versa. With the integration of Portugal, Spain, Greece and Turkey from EEC into the European Community the breadway tendencies of a more or less fascist type will have been reversed - at least for a while.

Then, the third circle. Again, we could do the same exercise and divide the world in four parts, with a first world of rich capitalist countries, a second world of not-so-rich socialist countries, a th world of very poor capitalist countries and then a fourth world, the world III corner of East and Southeast Asian countries headed by Japan. But we do not need that much specificity. Suffice it to say that the first country to get into the world capitalist market from the third circle, Japan, already is second to none in very many fields and that there are other countries in the same region following suit. Japan was the first country to practise the precepts of the New International Economic Order one century before it was conceived - how many will or can follow in its wake remains to be seen.

But the point to be made here is very simple. The third circle is not passive or a dependent variable any longer. There are efforts to co-opt, to tame (Trilateral Commission, OECD, European Community, the UN System for that matter, in part). The first world is certainly not a part of it, but is equally certainly moved by the third circle - and feels immensely threatened by non-first circle religions and ideologies. The spiritual/cultural challenge was seen by all the youth travelling east to sources of wisdom, and the economic challenge above all in Japan, but also in CECS and RCTC. But the military challenge is not yet there, only as terrorism. Of course, it will come - one day.



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So much for the general context in which the Nordic countries are located. What is the position of the third circle? With some very few exceptions this has been the periphery of Western Civilization, and has been exploited by Western civilization as such, both militarily/politically, economically and culturally throughout the last 2500 years or so, particularly the last five hundred. The gains have accrued to that part of the second circle that has been the center of the West at any time, which means that for the last 250 years or so the first circle, the North-western corner, has benefitted from a double process of exploitation, both inside the second circle and in the third circle. And this means that the Nordic countries have moved during the last 2500 years or so from being the (indeed!) periphery of the periphery of the center to becoming the periphery of the center of the center. This promotion, however, was not one of our own making, but because of what happened to or in our immediate context. In other words: some kind of promotion from being barbarians to becoming semi-barbarians, and semi-barbarians with center traits. This promotion was not a result of our own efforts, but a result of the fact, however, that we were gain, of Denmark-Sweden. Norway, for instance, was actually only promoted from periphery of the periphery of the periphery of the center to periphery of the center of the center of the center. And this may serve to characterize us in a global perspective. On the one hand we are - as mentioned - an unmistakable part of Western Civilization. On the other hand, we have not been very good at understanding or identifying ourselves as such, being much more concerned with our peripheral position inside that complex, and our painstakingly slow, but nevertheless relatively clear moves further towards the center, and the center towards us. We see ourselves in the European or Western context, not in the global context. We have been concerned with our advantages and disadvantages relative to the continental and transatlantic world much more than the more recent concern with how we stand relative to the third circle, to which we have sent our missionaries and participated in colonial trade as best we could.

In a sense it might be said that this somewhat mixed identification has been, on the whole, a tremendous blessing to the Nordic countries. In the first period, when we were the periphery of the periphery, we were definitely too far out to be worthy of being colonized at all - we were marginalized rather than exploited. The Roman empire stopped short of our lands. On the other hand

the distance was short enough to permit considerable diffusion particularly into the more civilized Nordic countries, Denmark and Sweden - there to be converted into forms comprehensible to the Nordics, processed and redistributed for consumption by the Danish satellites - Norway - and the Swedish - Finland, from the late Middle Ages into early 19th century. (giving to Norway and Finland the character of being, even to a considerable extent, the periphery of the periphery of the periphery of the center for some period). Not to mention the sami and Inuit peoples, from being centers in their own right to the ultimate periphery.

As the center of the West moved closer to our shores, to the north-western industrial belt stretching from the Midlands to the Ruhr (and further into Schlesien) it was not so much culture that reached us as the industrial revolution, with a respectable lag of about one century. It could grow on fertile soil because participation in a common system of mercantile capitalism (the Hanseatic League) and the sharing of the values and world views of Protestantism (or at least not Catholicism) constituted important common factors. But at this point it becomes more strange that we were not colonized, particularly taking into consideration that Denmark and Sweden in earlier periods had made some imperialistic excursions of their own, towards the south and towards the east - and Norway and Denmark even towards the west. The explanation might be that the viking raids, after all, had been forgotten and that our south and our east were themselves parts of the periphery, not so much in a position to retribute. We were, in fact, people who, generally siding with the stronger, playing games, having a tiny upper class that knew how to behave in the better circles of politics, economy and culture. And as to rebellion: could part of our tremendous fear of Russia be a fear that one day they might treat us like we treated them?

Basically, very little of what happened to our countries was the result of endogeneous processes, most of it can be seen as exogenous. processes of development and change, our countries riding high on diffusionist waves. In Norway one might even go so far as to postulate a fear of autonomy, a search for a center, a desire to remain somebody's periphery. In one period the center was Denmark (or rather Copenhagen), in another period it was Sweden, then came the anglophile period where the United Kingdom was the model, then the imposed rule from Germany, then

the long lasting ~~W. domination~~, then the effort of the Norwegian establishment to get into the European Community, and at present a period of some bewilderment, but still US-oriented.

Somehow we have been a part of the good company without being in its center, sharing the spoils without playing any major role in the exploitation, benefitting from the Western power centers militarily, economically and culturally without much effort, much creativity on our side. Danish capitalist imperialism, for instance, linked to ~~more~~ distant trading and even to slavery and the creation of plantation colonies were hardly the expressions of any Danish creativity, but rather an expression of the idea that solch ein Ding müssen wir auch haben. When Norway and Sweden did not participate in it, it was hardly because of any moral objections or political second thought, but rather because we entered too late or were not capable enough. But we certainly sent our missionaries, and goods (Sweden) and services (Norway) to a third circle ruled "safe" by the colonialist center. However that may be, in recent times we have become increasingly a part of the system of the first circle, yet at a certain distance, "as countries without a colonial tradition" (a statement highly untrue where Denmark is concerned). This has given to us a particular position as mediators between the Western center and the third circle, to some extent also between the Western center and the second circle - particularly the east, using our bridge, Finland. The Nordic function has been that of "bringing the parties to the negotiation table", of engineering compromises thereby saving the first circle from confrontations, blunting the attacks from the second and third circles because of the presumed legitimacy stemming from our position as peripheries to that center. This figleaf function, the notion of being "Western capitalism with a human face", is a role which makes it possible at the same time to be a part of the system and to reject certain of its characteristics when that is found opportune. To be in it but not of it, to be of it but not in it - these are roles played more or less skilfully by Finland relative to the Soviet Union, by Denmark relative to the European Community, by Norway and Denmark relative to NATO, and by Sweden relative to everything. Again, undeniably there is a certain talent at work in all of this - Hitler Germany being the only real conqueror the region has had, in addition to the Russian domination and the Soviet attack on Finland.

## 5. The Nordic countries as welfare state models.

It is not strange that the welfare state developed in the Nordic countries: we had all the advantages of being part of a system enriching itself at an increasing rate after post-renaissance mercantile capitalism, and particularly after industrial capitalism became increasingly globalized, while at the same time not having the disadvantages related to a ruthless upper class, bent on exploiting inner and outer peripheries. In very general terms we preferred to let others do the dirty work, the military jobs and the policing functions, sharing the benefits. Norwegian ships penetrated into the third circle after the Western center had conquered it, pacified it and built the harbours and the infrastructures that brought the produce down to them, even into the Norwegian ships themselves. The Danes constructed a network of trading companies. The Swedes imported raw materials, and exported industrial products deep into a third circle increasingly dominated by our first circle neighbors. It was and is an almost ideal combination, especially since the upper classes were relatively controllable by <sup>liberals and</sup> ~~a~~ social democratic labor movement. They could establish a social contract with less privilege given to the top and more welfare lower down (including farmers!) the contracts permitted to emerge in the center of the center. The net result was the social<sup>ist</sup> democratic Nordic welfare state, and its stability, even stable enough to be handed over to bourgeois coalitions for some intervals of rule and administration. Much of its stability, it should be added, was and is predicated on the Nordic ethnic homogeneity, with practically speaking no sharp borderlines sub-dividing the population, making some groups exploitable and marginal - the exception being, of course, the numerically inferior sami and inuit nations.

Given this it would not be strange if the idea emerged that the social democratic welfare state would be the Nordic gift to the world, an export product in line with <sup>the</sup> various varieties of Protestant Christianity that was our cultural export product in earlier periods (Norway being one of the countries in the world with the highest number of missionaries per capita).

It is not so obvious that this type of export, facilitated by the vast means put at the disposal of the Nordic countries under

the heading of "development assistance", will be successful. The institutions might be worth copying, but not the process that led to their emergence in our countries; nor the social costs that accompanied that process. Third circle countries, and particularly the population of these countries in dire need of the benefits of a welfare state, are characterized by much deeper contradictions relative to the first (and to some extent also the second) circles, and relative to their own upper classes than has ever been the case in the Nordic countries. Consequently, a process that could be evolutionary in our countries can hardly take an evolutionary course in most, or almost all of the third circle countries. There are social obstacles of formidable obstinacy to be overcome. Failure to understand this, coupled with a genuine identification with the victims, makes for a specifically Nordic naivete.

Moreover, it may also be that Third circle countries are more aware of <sup>our</sup> social costs than we in the Nordic countries are ourselves - some of them perhaps being ~~our~~ <sup>our</sup> ~~predominant~~ more than our costs. The kinds of things visiting Third World scholars, students and workers express in their more open and less polite moments seem to refer to such aspects as "excessive individualism", "a set of mutually isolated individuals", "low level of capacity to enjoy life", "no spontaneity, deep frozen emotions, meteorological coldness accompanied by human coldness", "high rates of mental illness, suicide, alcoholism, criminality, divorce" etc. Together with the difference in historical process this may go far to explain why there is much less interest in the Nordic countries in the world as a whole than there is eagerness to benefit from development <sup>ent</sup> assistance. The Nordic welfare state as an antiseptic, a-historical and purely beneficial human invention may not be accepted by peoples more sophisticated than the Nordic peoples themselves when it comes to understanding our countries - and processes of development in general. We are less interesting to others than to ourselves.

#### 6. The Nordic countries as carriers of Western cosmology.

The Nordic countries - liberal, Christian, capitalistic - are of course above all Western countries, only secondarily Nordic countries. As Western countries they carry the predominant ethos of Western Civilization, and even in a very pronounced form. The idea of seeing the world as a circle with oneself in the center, and the rest in a periphery eager to be converted by our Gospel

is strongly pronounced. The idea of progress is clearly present. The optimistic notion that progress can be obtained through manipulation of a small set of factors is there. The idea that social structures are essentially vertical and individualistic takes in the Nordic countries a soft form - competition, (e.g. in sports) more than fight and struggle - but the basic idea is there. And the relationship to nature also has a softer form: perhaps less merciless exploitation of nature for industrial purposes, more use of nature for recreation - but real compassion or togetherness with nature, in a non-instrumental fashion, not using nature for some purpose, is probably not very developed (assuming that it is developed in some parts of the third circle). And our Protestant God is highly universalistic, contritist, jealous - and an old male.

If anything the Nordic countries may be said to be more Western than most of the West, precisely because of relative homogeneity. Even if women are less Western than men; young and the old more non-Western than the middle aged; the countryside less Western than the cities and so on, the differences are probably smaller than in countries further to the south, among other reasons simply because social diffusion from center to periphery can flow so easily in our countries, there being few real watersheds or discontinuities that may refract the diffusion process. Ethnic minorities may be harbingers of alternative cosmologies; but there is only the endangered Sami alternative. One conclusion would be that it probably is good for the world that the Nordic countries have so few inhabitants. If we had more we might have been dangerous, not only to the third circle and to the second circle, but even to the first circle, self-righteous and missionary, zealous and hard-working as we were. And - are?

Another, and more important (because less hypothetical) consequence is also essentially negative: there is less diversity in our westernness than may be found further south. Of course, this phenomenon is masked by the fact that we appear less imperialistic, less expansionist, "centrifugal", because we do not have the power to match our potential aspirations. But if a real confrontation should come between the third circle and the first circle, and the days of Western expansionism are gone, the assumption would be that the Nordic countries would have less to fall back upon in terms of alternative social program, so to speak, than countries ridden by deeper contradictions than ours. There

is little reason to believe that there is more potential for alternative ways of life in the deeper recesses of the vallies of Norway, or the vast northern expanses of Sweden and Finland, than in regions of such countries as United Kingdom, France and Spain currently fighting for higher measures of autonomy. To put it simply: if the pendulum of Western Civilization should turn from its present centrifugal phase towards a more centripetal period, the Nordic countries might have less to draw upon and again come into a period as periphery, having to learn how to become more inward directed, less expansionist, perhaps more like first and second circles countries did during the Middle Ages. On the other hand, having been less expansionist than the big neighbors we would also have less distance to go. So, maybe we would come out about equal!

7. Conclusion: what is the structure of all this?


Let me now try to put these threads together. On the one hand there is a Nordic system with its internal differentiation and history, important to its inhabitants, less to the surrounding world. On the other hand there is a world system, also with its internal differentiation and history, in which the Nordic system is embedded. Partly because of the modest size of the Nordic system, partly because of its peripheral location - less important as a factor in our age of means of transportation/communication - the world system has had considerably more impact on the Nordic system than vice versa (with the possible exception of the viking period). The statement is not so trivial as it sounds: the assumption is a certain openness to the outside so as to be influenced and shaped, yet not so much that total absorption takes place. The Nordic system still retains a certain specificity - perhaps best observed at one of the peaks in "nordicity", that little speck in the Atlantic known as the Faray islands. Go there, and return happier, wiser. Very small is very beautiful.

The basic theses put forward above can now be summarized:

- (1) The general policy of the Nordic countries has been to be accepted by the First circle, North-western Europe and North America, sharing most of their (changing) views of the Second and the Third







But what happens when the pig is getting old and/or unhealthy, and/or there are many other pigs, not to mention other animals around? We have to remember that the basic features of the Nordic orientation to the world were shaped in a period when transportation/communication would limit the social perspective to the neighbors. This factor does not explain why, for instance, the United States is seen as a neighbor and Russia/Soviet Union not. There are other factors in the picture, the First circle simply became rich, partly as a result of the policies towards the Second and the Third circles. And the rest follows, more or less as summarized in the eight points above.

And then there are three clear possible courses to be taken for the four piglets:

- A: continue riding piggy-back, on the same pig, some what so,
- B: hanging to some other pig, continuing riding piggy-back
- C: jumping off the pig, feeding for themselves

I see absolutely no reason why these three courses of action should exclude each other. Just to the contrary, they can be seen as complementary, only that the argument would be a less one-sided accommodation (A) to the exclusion of the other two.

Thus, the Nordic policy world picture is a picture of the First circle class, overlooking competition in the Second and Third circles and at the same time overlooking some Nordic self-interests. Self-interest, self-interest - the latter words entered, and the first will be seen as a necessity to be developed in order to be able to meet world crises in a rational way. Conceptually this world picture rather corresponds and contrasts (as to the Soviet Union (learning from the West), Western Europe and Southern Europe - the latter is probably moving along not too badly. And to reach East, and Asian countries and a third class to the whole Third circle, both the local parts (Third circle) and the whole part (the whole world).

Let start about the political/military tier, anticipating the pattern. My argument will be that there are conflict playing in the world, slowly but surely, now and then exploding, between the First circle on the one hand and the Second/Third on the other - not a very original position. Any kind of alliance between might take place. Thinking that one day the Soviet Union elements of political reform and new economic structures, welcoming the new kind of political awakening of that place, partly allowing, partly in chains, partly denying (denying the) Soviet's regime, regime - almost anything can happen.

In the last 10 years, the world has changed in the middle of a really major conflict - between America, on the stronger side of which there is one strong argument in favor: the principles of the First circle - there exists not only one circle in an individual state in conflict with the other state. There is no denying that the world is going to be different in the near future. "Thinking of the world state" is the point

will not end in the near future although it is generally not to legitimate. It is a reality, including a political reality. In the world of this world, it is a reality that any kind of individual; a possibility itself being a major part of that world. However, realizing it is a little different; it is a little different in the last 10 years or less of the going in for. The first circle has not the power to have that political solidarity; by realizing the first representative parts and kinds of the First circle some kind of, or by making relations in the direction of a better future world for with some stability, some kind of state, finally leading to a new world of the world. It is a little different, but it is a little different.

Let start the "future". Let that started with the political question: what will be the concrete meaning of a higher level of political solidarity? Let us start with the meaning of self-reliance. Let us start with the meaning of self-reliance. Let us start with the meaning of self-reliance. Let us start with the meaning of self-reliance.